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1 Introduction
Following Melitz (2003), a fast growing literature has been studying the consequences
of heterogeneous firms on the effects of trade and trade liberalization.1 Many of these
studies have clear structural predictions about the relationship between trade liber-
alization, and firm-level, trade-induced labor layoffs when firms differ in their total
factor productivity. Despite the interest in the role of heterogeneity, however, many
of the theoretical implications and relationships of Melitz’s model regarding the la-
bor market have not yet been tested empirically. In this paper, we make an attempt
to narrow this gap by providing empirical evidence for the interaction between firm
productivity, and trade liberalization in the determination of firm-level, trade-induced
layoffs.
Melitz (2003) develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to ex-
amine the intra-industry effects of international trade. He finds that opening to trade
causes the least productive firms to stop producing and the more productive firms to
start exporting, as only the more productive firms can bear the fixed trade costs. As a
result, market shares are reallocated toward more productive firms, which leads to an
aggregate productivity increase and an increase in the zero-profit productivity cutoff,
defined as the minimum productivity level needed for a firm to produce domestically.
Melitz also shows that trade liberalization results in an increase in the zero-profit
productivity cutoff and a decrease in the export productivity cutoff, defined as the
minimum productivity level needed for a firm to enjoy profitable exports.
In this paper, we test (and provide empirical support for) some important predic-
tions from the structural Melitz model regarding the direction and the magnitude of
the changes in the zero-profit productivity cutoff and in the export productivity cutoff
when a country liberalizes its trade policy. In addition, our main contribution is that
we are able to quantify the relationship between firm productivity, trade liberaliza-
tion and firm-level layoffs caused by trade liberalization. To do this, we stay close
to the original Melitz framework but, naturally, we concentrate on labor market out-
comes, and we employ a reliable and original data set that allows us to directly identify
firm-level, trade-induced layoffs.2 Finally, by allowing for some intuitive labor market
interactions that are not explicitly captured in the Meliz model, we reconcile some
discrepancies between theory and empirics and we open avenues for further theoretical
work that will bring the firm-heterogeneity literature closer to the data.
We start our theoretical exposition by deriving firm-level employment in an autarky
equilibrium. Then, we determine the equilibrium number of workers for each firm when
1See Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), Egger and Kreickemeier (2007), Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004) among many others.
2This database is the Petition for Trade Adjustment Assistance (PTAA), which constructed and
maintained by the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor.
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the country opens to costly trade and exercises protection. Finally, we describe the case
of trade liberalization, which is the basis for our empirical analysis. The theoretical
predictions of our structural model in regard to the labor market outcomes suggest
that, all else equal, symmetric trade liberalization with the rest of the world will result
in: (a) layoffs for the firms that do not export; (b) gross layoffs in the domestic segment
of the exporters; (c) gross hires in the export segment of the exporters; and, (d) net
hires for the exporting firms. In addition, we show that all of the above effects are
stronger for the more productive firms and for more pronounced trade liberalization.
Since our data allows us to identify only trade-induced layoffs (as opposed both
layoffs and hires), in our empirical analysis we are able to test only some of the model’s
theoretical predictions. Overall, our results indicate that firm productivity, trade lib-
eralization, and the interactions between them are indeed key determinants of the
magnitude of firm-level layoffs. In particular, we find that increase in trade liberal-
ization is associated with more layoffs at the firm level. We estimate that, all else
equal, one percent increase in trade liberalization (measured as the ratio between 3-
year lagged and current tariffs) translates into 50 percent increase in firm-level layoffs.
In addition, we find that trade liberalization results in a decrease in the export pro-
ductivity cutoff and in an increase (but smaller in absolute value) in the zero-profit
productivity cutoff for domestic production.
All of the above results are in accordance with the theoretical predictions of the
heterogeneous firms model. However, while, throughout most of the paper, we follow
Melitz’s framework quite closely, in the empirical analysis we also incorporate several
intuitive labor market interactions that are not captured in the structural model but
further improve the performance of Melitz’s theory. In particular, first, we allow
for firm size (in terms of employment), in addition to the productivity, to separately
affect layoffs. While we do not find that not controlling for firm size leads to significant
biases in the structural parameters, we do capture the fact that larger firms lay off
more workers, which is in accordance with our priors. Second, our empirical analysis
suggest that higher labor costs are associated with lower probability to suffer from
trade-induced layoffs. A possible explanation is that better paid workers might have
more human capital and represent firms in industries in which the US has comparative
advantage.
Finally, probably the most intriguing empirical finding is that, all else equal, more
productive firms suffer fewer layoffs, which is against the theoretical prediction that the
relationship between total factor productivity (TFP) and layoffs should be positive.
In order to reconcile theory and empirics, we decompose the effects of productivity
by firm type, i.e. exporters vs. non-exporters. Our (intuitive) hypothesis is that,
even though theory predicts that, regardless or their export status, more productive
firms should lay off more workers, this is not the case for exporters. Instead of laying
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off workers who produce for the domestic market and hiring workers for the foreign
market, exporting firms end up with net hires (as we show formally below). Firms
that are exporters just shift part of their production, along with the accompanying
labor force, from domestic market production to foreign market production. The
corresponding empirical specification supports our hypothesis. In particular, once we
decompose the productivity effects on layoffs by firm’s export status, we find that the
relationship is positive for non-exporters, as suggested by the theoretical model, but
it is negative for exporters, in accordance with our empirical hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the
theoretical model and we discuss its properties and implications. Section 3 presents
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Setting
Our theoretical exposition follows Melitz (2003), however, we concentrate on the labor
market implications of the model. In particular, we analyze the effects of productivity,
trade liberalization and their interactions on trade-induced, firm-level layoffs.
2.1 Autarky Equilibrium
Consumption. The representative consumer enjoys a continuum of goods indexed by
ω, and her utility takes a CES functional form: U =
[∫
ωΩ
q(ω)ρdω
] 1
ρ , where q(ω)
denotes consumption of variety ω, Ω is the mass of potentially available goods, and
σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Consumer’s total
utility can be thought of as obtained from consumption of an aggregate good, U ≡ Q,
which is composed of different varieties, with a corresponding aggregate price index
P =
[∫
ωΩ
p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ . Making use of the definitions of aggregate consumption
and the CES price index, we solve the representative consumer’s problem to obtain
demand, q(ω) = Q
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
, and expenditure, r(ω) = R
[
p(ω)
P
]1−σ
, for each variety ω,
where R = PQ =
∫
ωΩ
r(ω)dω denotes aggregate expenditure.
Production. There is a continuum of firms, and each of them produces a different
variety ω. Production technology requires only labor and is subject to l = f+q/ϕ. All
firms pay the same fixed cost f , but have different productivity levels ϕ > 0.3 Given
the demand for its product, each firm maximizes its profits by setting the price of its
variety as a mark-up over marginal cost: p(ϕ) = 1
ρϕ
, where the wage rate is normalized
to one. Thus, firm revenues can be expressed as r(ϕ) = R(Pρϕ)σ−1, so that the ratio of
any two firms’ revenues only depends on their productivities r(ϕi)/r(ϕj) = (ϕi/ϕj)
σ−1.
3 Thus, each variety ω can be uniquely mapped to a single productivity level ϕ.
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Furthermore, firm profits, pi(ϕ) = r(ϕ)
σ
− f , and labor demand, l(ϕ) = f + σ−1
σ
r(ϕ),
can also be expressed as functions of productivity.
Entry. There is a large pool of potential entrants who are identical prior to entry.
In order to produce, firms must pay a fixed entry cost fe > 0, which is sunk. After
entry, firms draw their productivity ϕ from a distribution g(ϕ), with a cumulative
distribution G(ϕ). If a firm has a low productivity draw, it exits immediately. Firms
that decide to produce face an exogenous probability of death δ in each period. As the
productivity level of a firm does not change throughout its lifetime, its optimal per-
period profit level remains constant as well. Thus, if a firm’s profits are negative upon
entry, the firm will exit immediately. This scenario implies a zero-profit productivity
cutoff condition pi(ϕa) = 0 ⇐⇒ r(ϕa) = σf , which determines the lowest productivity
draw, ϕa, needed for a firm to stay in the market. Any firm with productivity level
ϕ < ϕa will exit immediately, and the productivity distribution of the firms that stay
in the market will be µ(ϕ) = g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕa) , where 1 − G(ϕa) is the ex-ante probability
of successful entry. This defines the aggregate productivity level ϕ˜ as a function of
the cut-off level ϕa,4 and also allows to express average revenues as a function of ϕa,
r(ϕ˜) =
[
ϕ˜(ϕa)
ϕa
]σ−1
σf .
Free entry implies that new firms will join the industry as long as the average profit
in the sector is positive. Let M denote the equilibrium number of firms that ensures
that economic profits are competed away.5 In equilibrium, aggregate variables such as
the CES price index P and the aggregate expenditure R can be expressed in terms of
the equilibrium number of firms and the average productivity so that P = M
1
1−σ p(ϕ˜) =
M
1
1−σ 1
ρϕ˜
, and R = Mr(ϕ˜), respectively. This enables us to express firm revenues in
autarky as a function of the zero-profit productivity cutoff r(ϕ) = σfϕσ−1
(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
.
Consequently, we obtain the equilibrium number of workers employed by firm with
productivity ϕ in autarky as:
la = f + (σ − 1)f
(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
ϕσ−1. (2.1)
According to (2.1), more productive firms will employ more workers. Intuitively, more
productive firms enjoy larger market shares and, therefore, need and employ more
workers.
4More specifically, ϕ˜(ϕa) =
[
1
1−G(ϕa)
∫∞
ϕa
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
. As shown in Melitz (2003), ϕ˜ is also
the average productivity level for the firms that choose to produce and stay in the market.
5See Melitz (2003) for the properties of the equilibrium and details on aggregation.
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2.2 Costly Trade
The world consists of n+ 1 ≥ 2 identical countries.6 Domestic firms may export their
products to any country after they pay a fixed export cost, fx > 0 (in addition to the
fixed cost, f , which they still must incur to produce domestically). The decision to
export is made after each firm draws its productivity level. Firms that export serve
the domestic market as well.
Regardless of their export status, all firms pay the same overhead production cost.
In addition, exporting firms face higher marginal cost for their exports due to ad-
valorem tariffs, t, which are assumed to be symmetric across all trading partners.
Thus, each firm’s domestic pricing rule is defined as before, pd(ϕ) = 1/ρϕ, while export
prices are px(ϕ) = (1 + t)pd(ϕ) = (1 + t)/ρϕ, where subscript d stands for ‘domestic,’
and subscript x stands for ‘export.’ Price separability translates into separability of
exporting firms’ revenues: r(ϕ) = rd(ϕ), if a firm is selling only domestically; and
r(ϕ) = rd(ϕ) + nrx(ϕ) = [1 + n(1 + t)
1−σ]rd(ϕ), if a firm is exporting. Furthermore,
and exporting firm’s profits can be split into their domestic, pid(ϕ), and foreign, npix(ϕ),
portions. Finally, each exporting firm’s labor demand, lct(ϕ) = lctd (ϕ)+nl
ct
x (ϕ), can also
be decomposed into its domestic, lctd = f+rd(ϕ)
σ−1
σ
, and exporting, lctx = fx+rx(ϕ)
σ−1
σ
,
portions, where superscript ct denotes ‘costly trade.’
As in the autarky equilibrium, there is a large pool of potential entrants and firms
with negative domestic profits will exit immediately. In addition, however, some firms
will also choose to export, as long as their productivity draw is high enough to allow
them to realize non-negative profits from exports. This means that there will be two
zero-profit productivity cutoff conditions: one for domestic profits, pid(ϕ
ct) = 0, which
determines the lowest productivity draw, ϕct, needed for a firm to stay in business; and
one for export profits, pix(ϕ
ct
x ) = 0, which determines the lowest productivity draw,
ϕctx , needed for a firm to export.
The fact that each firm must incur additional fixed costs, fx, in order to export, im-
plies that the lowest productivity draw, ϕctx , needed for profitable exports is necessarily
higher than the lowest productivity threshold, ϕct, needed for domestic production.
See Figure 1. In addition, the minimum productivity draw needed for domestic pro-
-
-ϕ
a ϕct ϕctx
ϕ
Figure 1: Firm Productivity and Costly Trade
6Thus, each country has n ≥ 1 potential trading partners, and all countries share the same wages
and same aggregate variables.
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duction must increase once the country opens to trade. The intuition is that when
some domestic firms start exporting, their market shares increase. As a result their
demand for resources increases and this bids up real wage. Consequently, some of the
least productive domestic firms are driven out of the market and there is an increase
in the average productivity level and in the zero-profit productivity cutoff for domestic
production.
Our analysis of employment in the trade equilibrium resembles the closed economy
case, but this time we use the average domestic productivity level ϕ˜ and the average
export productivity level ϕ˜x.
7 First, we express average revenues and aggregate vari-
ables in terms of the zero-profit productivity cutoffs, then we use them to solve for the
equilibrium number of workers employed in each firm depending on its export status.
The labor equation for the firms that only serve the domestic market is very similar
to the one describing the autarky equilibrium:
lct = f + (σ − 1)f
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
ϕσ−1. (2.2)
The only difference between (2.1) and (2.2) is that the zero domestic profit productivity
threshold is higher in the trade equilibrium (ϕct > ϕa). The equilibrium number of
workers employed by an exporting firm is:
lct = f + (σ − 1)f
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
ϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic
+nfx + (σ − 1)f
(
1
ϕctx
)σ−1
n(1 + t)1−σϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
export
, (2.3)
where, following the theoretical implications of the model, we decompose total em-
ployment in the exporting firms into workers who produce for the domestic market
(term labeled ‘domestic’), and workers who produce exports (term labeled ‘export’).
The difference between the equilibrium number of workers employed in each firm
in autarky, defined in equation (2.1), and the corresponding number of workers em-
ployed by the same firm in the trade equilibrium, defined in equations (2.2) and (2.3)
(depending on the firm’s type), obtains the change in firm-level employment caused
by trade. For firms that only sell domestically, it is:
la − lct = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1. (2.4)
(2.4) implies that the number of workers employed in a firm that only sells domestically
will be lower in the trade equilibrium (as ϕct is larger than ϕa). These firms will lay off
7Average export productivity is similar to its domestic counterpart, and is equal to ϕ˜(ϕctx ) =[
1
1−G(ϕctx )
∫∞
ϕctx
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
.
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workers when the country opens to trade. The change in employment for the exporters
is:
la − lct = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic(layoffs)
−
nfx − (σ − 1)f
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
n(1 + t)1−σϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
export(hires)
(2.5)
Opening to trade has two opposing effects on employment for the exporting firms.
First, just like in the case of firms that do not export, the number of workers involved
in production for the domestic market will be inversely affected by trade. This is
captured by the positive, first term ‘domestic(layoffs)’ in (2.5). Note that this term,
and the corresponding effect, is identical to the total effect on employment for firms
that sell only domestically. Second, the number of workers involved in production of
exports will increase (from zero in autarky). This is captured by the negative, second
term ‘export(hires)’ in (2.5). The net effect on employment for the exporting firms
when a country opens from autarky to trade is ambiguous and depends on the firm’s
productivity level. When the country is exposed to trade the exporters face a trade
off between increase in revenues and increase in fixed costs due to additional export
cost. Melitz (2003) shows the most productive export firms increase their profit and
market share whereas the less productive exporters increase their market share but
are subject to profit loss. Consequently, there are net hires for firms who realize an
increase profits and net layoffs for firms who realize a drop in profits.
While interesting from a theoretical perspective, the above analysis is empirically
irrelevant, as we rarely observe a move from autarky to trade.8 Most of the time,
countries experience trade liberalization. In particular, intense liberalization is what
happened in the US economy, which is the subject of our study, during the period
of investigation 1980-2005. Therefore, in the next section, we derive and discuss the
effects of trade liberalization on the labor market, and we quantify these effects in our
empirical analysis.
8A couple of notable exceptions, as noted by Feenstra and Taylor (2008), include the aftermath of
the US embargo in the early 1800s, and the opening of the Japanese economy to trade during 1850s.
A more recent example of a country that rapidly opened its borders to trade with the rest of the
world is Mexico. In the mid 80s, Mexico slashed its tariffs (and other trade barriers) as part of its
accession into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). During the 90s, this country
signed a very important free trade agreement (FTA) with US and Canada, (NAFTA). In addition,
during the same period, Mexico entered into series of FTAs with other Latin American nations, as
well as with Israel and with the European Union in 2000.
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2.3 Trade Liberalization
Qualitatively, the effects of trade liberalization are identical to the effects of opening
to trade. Figure 2 depicts the changes in the zero-profit productivity cutoffs (both
domestic and export) in response to trade liberalization. The export productivity
-
- - ﬀϕ
a ϕct ϕtl ϕtlx ϕ
ct
x
ϕ
Figure 2: Firm Productivity and Trade Liberalization
cutoff decreases from ϕctx to ϕ
tl
x because, due to lower export costs,
9 firms with lower
productivity levels now find it profitable to export. More exporters increase labor
demand and bids up real wages. This results in market share losses, accompanied
by layoffs, for some domestically producing firms. In addition, the least productive
firms are forced to exit, which leads to an increase in the minimum threshold needed
for domestic production (from ϕct to ϕtl). Theory allows us to further formalize the
relationship between the zero domestic productivity cutoff and the export productivity
cutoff in the following proposition.10
Proposition 2.1 With symmetric trade liberalization, the increase in the zero-profit
domestic productivity cutoff is smaller, in absolute value, than the decrease in the
export productivity cutoff: ∣∣∣ϕct − ϕtl
ϕct
∣∣∣ < ϕctx − ϕtlx
ϕctx
.
The more a country liberalizes its trade policy, the bigger the difference between the
changes in productivity cutoffs.
Proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the lower magnitude in the increase in the
zero-profit productivity cut-off can be explained by the secondary nature of the effect
on the firms that produce only domestically. The direct effect of trade liberalization
falls on the exporting side of the market where more firms can afford to bear the sunk
cost of exporting and, therefore, the zero-profit export cut-off falls as a direct result of
trade liberalization. The increase in the zero-profit cut-off for domestically producing
firms is caused by the fact that resource prices are bid up by the exporters and that
forces some of the less productive firms to leave the market.
9The model assumes symmetric trade liberalization, so that any decrease in domestic protection
is matched by an equivalent decrease in foreign protection, with symmetric effects on foreign firms.
10In the empirical analysis, we use the predictions of this proposition to translate changes in the
export productivity cutoff into changes in the domestic productivity cutoff.
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Following the steps of the derivation of firm-level employment outcomes when the
economy moves from autarky to trade, we can express the number of workers laid off
due to trade liberalization by the firms that sell only domestically as:
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1. (2.6)
The only difference between (2.6) and (2.4) is in the zero productivity thresholds. (2.6)
implies that the number of workers employed in a firm that only sells domestically will
be lower after trade liberalization took place (as ϕtl is larger than ϕct).
The change in employment, due to trade liberalization, for an exporting firm is:
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic(layoffs)
+
n(σ − 1)fx
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
(1 + tct)1−σ −
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1
(1 + ttl)1−σ
]
ϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
export(hires)
,
(2.7)
where, trade liberalization is measured by a discrete tariff reduction from tct to ttl.
As in the case of a move from autarky to trade, trade liberalization has two opposing
effects on employment for the exporting firms. First, the number of workers involved
in production for the domestic market will be inversely affected by trade liberalization.
This is captured by the first term ‘domestic(layoffs)’. Note that this term, and the
corresponding effect, is identical to the total effect on employment for firms that sell
only domestically. Second, the number of workers involved in production of exports
will increase. This is captured by the negative, second term ‘export(hires)’ in (2.7). In
addition, it can be shown that, with trade liberalization, the second effect unambigu-
ously dominates the first for the firms that are exporters before and after the trade.11
This implies that there will be net hires in the exporting firms. Furthermore, it is
clear from (2.6) and (2.7) that the magnitude of employment changes (both layoffs
and hires) is contingent on firm productivity as well. We formalize the effects of trade
and production on employment in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Symmetric trade liberalization with the rest of the world will result
in: (a) layoffs for firms that do not export; (b) gross layoffs in the domestic segment
11Note that when the economy opened up to trade from autarky, some less productive exporters
suffered a profit loss due to the additional fixed export costs. For firms who have been exporting
before and after trade liberalization, this is not an issue because the fixed cost of exporting do not
change as a result of trade liberalization.
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of the exporters; (c) gross hires in the export segment of the exporters; (d) net hires
for the exporting firms. All of the above effects will be stronger for the more productive
firms and for more pronounced trade liberalization.
Proof is in the Appendix. The intuition for these results is that once a country opens
to symmetric trade liberalization with the rest of the world, firms that export gain net
market share and the gain is larger for the more productive exporters. The increase in
market share and profits for the exporting firms is associated with more hires and a net
increase in employment. The increase in employment is larger for the more productive
exporters. Higher labor demand (due to the exports) bids up the price of this input,
and forces some of the firms that only produce for the domestic market to exit, while
others lose market shares and lay off workers. The bigger (more productive) the losers,
the larger the layoffs.
As evident from the analysis so far, theory generates clear and sharp predictions
about the effects of trade liberalization and productivity on firm-level employment.
Unfortunately, some empirical limitations do not allow us to test the compete set of
structural relationships in the model. For example, even though our data set has
the unique advantage of measuring trade-induced layoffs directly, it does not measure
hires due to trade liberalization or due to improved access to (new) foreign markets.
Therefore, we will not be able to estimate (2.7). Instead, we will concentrate on the
layoffs in the firms that only produce for the domestic market, (2.6), along with the
layoffs in the domestic segment of the exporting firms, the first term in (2.7), by
estimating the following equation for all firms in our sample:
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1. (2.8)
where, lct − ltl measures trade-induced layoffs, regardless of whether a firm produces
only for the domestic market or it also exports.12
We address one more empirical issue before we bring our model to the data. Es-
timating (2.8) directly will provide evidence for the relationship between productivity
and trade-induced layoffs, but will say nothing about the relationship between trade
liberalization and layoffs. To address this problem, we resort to the theoretical prop-
erties of the model. In particular, we employ the two zero-profit cutoff conditions to
express the zero-profit domestic productivity cutoff ϕτ , τ ∈ {ct, tl}, in terms of tariffs
and the corresponding export productivity cutoff ϕτx as:
ϕτ = ϕτx
1
(1 + tτ )
(
f
fx
) 1
σ−1
. (2.9)
12In the empirical section we discus the implications of differentiating between the two types of
firms.
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Plug (2.9) in (2.8) to obtain an expression for the number of layoffs caused by trade
liberalization in terms of productivity and trade protection (ad-valorem tariffs):
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)fx
(
1 + tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 − (σ − 1)fx
(
1 + ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1
(2.10)
(2.10) is the structural base for our empirical analysis of the effects of trade liber-
alization and productivity on trade-induced layoffs. According to the predictions of
Proposition 2.2, we expect to find a positive relationship between trade liberalization
and layoffs as well as between productivity and layoffs. We test these relationships
next.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data Description
This study covers the period 1980-2005 and we employ various series of US firm-level
and sectoral data. The main advantage of our data is that it allows us to directly
identify trade-induced losses, in terms of firm layoffs. Our primary data source is the
Petition for Trade Adjustment Assistance Database (PTAA), which is constructed and
maintained by the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department
of Labor.13 The PTAA data consists of petition series at the 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) level including the date when a group of workers files a TAA
petition, when and whether the petition was certified, and the estimated number of
workers to be laid off by each firm (according to the petition) as an adverse consequence
of foreign trade. To measure trade-induced layoffs we only consider petitions that were
TAA-certified.14
To estimate total factor firm productivity, the main explanatory variable in our
estimations, we follow the procedure from Petrin and Levinsohn (2003) and the Stata
routine -levpet- by Petrin et al. (2004). Petrin and Levinsohn (2003) emphasize the
simultaneity problem and estimate production functions using intermediate inputs to
control for unobservable productivity shocks.15 Following the existing literature, we
13A petition may be filed by a group of three or more workers, an employer of a group of workers,
a union, and certain other officials. In order to be eligible for trade adjustment assistance, laid of
workers need certification as they are adversely affected by foreign trade.
14There are some instances in the data, when the same firm files TAA petitions from different
4-digit sectors in the same year. To keep the number of observations as large as possible, we treat
such petitions as separate observations in our sample. Accordingly, in our estimations, we cluster the
errors by firm and industry. Aggregating the sample to the firm level produces very similar results.
15The firm-level variables used in the calculation of TFP include (Compustat labels in parenthesis):
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transform our productivity variable in deviations from the mean. This is inconsequen-
tial for the significance of our estimates, but eases interpretation. Once we calculate
total factor productivity for each firm, we merge these data with the certified firms
from the TAA data set. This determines the size of the estimation sample for our
main analysis to be 2063 observations.16
In addition to firm-level data on layoffs and productivity, we also employ various
labor and trade variables at the firm and at the industry level. These include: firm-
level total employment, labor costs, and export status; and, industry-level data on
tariffs and imports. Total employment is measured by total number of employees and
taken from Compustat. Labor cost is calculated by multiplying the total number of
employees with the average industry wage, which is taken from Bartelsman, Becker,
and Gray (2001). We follow Denis et al. (2002) who use Compustat’s firm-level data
series on “Geographic Segment Type” to classify firms as either exporters or non-
exporters.
We use tariff data to measure trade liberalization. Even though, non-tariff trade
barriers (NTBs) are probably a more significant and relevant measure of trade protec-
tion, we choose tariffs for two reasons. First, comprehensive data on NTBs covering
the period of investigation are not available. Second, we believe that US tariffs, which,
for the period of interest in this paper, are determined under the regulations and rules
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, by the World
Trade Organization (WTO), are the more appropriate measure of protection for the
current theoretical setting, which assumes symmetric trade liberalization. We use two
sources of data on tariffs. Import-weighted average tariffs for the period 1980-1988 are
from Bernard et al. (2006), and tariff data for the years after 1989 are from the Trade
Analysis Information System (TRAINS).17 In order to keep the sample size as large
as possible, we use tariffs at the 3-digit SIC level. In addition, we employ current and
3-year lagged tariffs to measure trade liberalization and to obtain our main estima-
tion results.18 Data on sectoral imports are also from two sources. Data on imports
Output (Net Sales), Material Cost (Total Cost of Goods Sold + Selling, General, and Administrative
Expenses - Capital Depreciation and Amortization - Labor Cost), Labor (Total Number of Employ-
ees), Capital (Value of Property, Plant and Equipment Net of Depreciation), Investment (Capital
Expenditures). In addition, we use Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2001) to obtain the following
industry-level variables: Production Workers, Production Worker Wages, Deflator for value of ship-
ments, Deflator for material costs and Deflator for Investment.
16It should be noted that, even though our study covers an extended time span, we will be estimat-
ing cross-section econometric specifications, where each observation represents a petition-firm-year
combination, and all variables are in real terms.
17We accessed TRAINS through the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) soft-
ware at http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/.
18Three years is often viewed in the literature as the average period needed for trade (an other)
variables to adjust to trade shocks and policies. In the sensitivity analysis, we experiment with
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up to 1989 are from Feenstra (1996), and imports for the years after 1989 are from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and TRAINS.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 of the Technical Appendix.
3.2 Estimation Results and Analysis
Our first attempt in testing the theoretical predictions of the model is to estimate a
reduced-form linearized version of our structural equation,
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)fx
(
1 + tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 − (σ − 1)fx
(
1 + ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1,
(3.1)
which relates trade-induced, firm-level layoffs to the interaction between firm’s pro-
ductivity and lagged industry tariffs and to the interaction between firm productivity
and current tariffs. (3.1) translates into the following econometric specification:
LAY OFFi = α˜0 + α˜1L3.Tj ∗ TFPi + α˜2Tj ∗ TFPi + ϑj + εij, (3.2)
where: LAY OFFi is the logarithm of the number of trade-induced layoffs in firm i.
TFPi proxies for the term ϕ
σ−1, and measures total factor productivity of firm i. Tj
and L3.Tj are the logarithms of current and 3-year lagged ad-valorem tariffs in industry
j, which proxy for (1 + ttl)σ−1 and (1 + tct)σ−1, respectively. Finally, ϑj denotes a set
of 3-digit SIC industry fixed effects, which we use to control for unobserved sectoral
characteristics that may affect trade-induced layoffs but are not explicitly included in
the theoretical specification (such as comparative advantage, for example).19
In accordance with the predictions of the structural model, we expect the coef-
ficient, α˜1, in front of the first term, to be positive, implying a direct relationship
between the interaction of total factor productivity and lagged tariffs and the number
of workers laid-off by each firm due to trade liberalization. The estimate of α˜2 should
be negative, implying an inverse relationship between the interaction of current tariffs
and productivity. All else equal, higher current tariffs are associated with fewer layoffs.
Finally, since theory suggests that the zero-profit export productivity cutoff falls (from
ϕctx to ϕ
tl
x ) due to trade liberalization, we expect α˜1 to be smaller, in absolute value,
than α˜2. To see this, interpret the two coefficients structurally, as α˜1 =
(σ−1)fx
(ϕctx )
σ−1 and
shorter and longer lags to find that the changes in our results are intuitive, and in accordance with
the model’s theoretical predictions. Results are also robust to measuring trade liberalization at a
more aggregated level.
19We choose 3-digit SIC dummies to match the level of tariff aggregation that are used in the
interaction variables. An additional advantage of this particular level of sectoral aggregation is that
it delivers a representative number of firms from each industry.
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α˜2 = − (σ−1)fx(ϕtlx )σ−1 , respectively. It easy to see now, that ϕ
ct
x > ϕ
tl
x implies α˜1 < |α˜2|. In
addition, we can use the ratio between the two estimates to calculate the percentage
change (fall) in the zero-profit export productivity cutoff caused by trade liberalization
as:20
ϕctx − ϕtlx
ϕctx
=
(−α˜2) 1σ−1 − α˜
1
σ−1
1
(−α˜2) 1σ−1
. (3.3)
As can be seen from the table, the estimates of the coefficients on both terms are
significant and have signs and relative magnitude as expected. The interaction between
lagged tariffs and productivity has a positive effect on layoffs, while the interaction of
current tariffs and productivity has a negative effect on layoffs. In addition, we find
that α˜1 is indeed smaller, in absolute value, as compared to α˜2. We use (3.3), with
σ = 6, to estimate a significant fall in the zero-profit export productivity cutoff of
7.56% (standard error 4.49). We report this estimate in the bottom panel of Table
1.21 Combined with the predictions from Proposition 2.1, our estimates imply an
increase in the zero-profit domestic productivity cutoff of 7.28%, which however is
only marginally statistically significant (standard error 4.50).
According to Melitz’s theory, more productive firms will always be larger, as they
will have larger market shares, i.e. there should be perfect correlation between produc-
tivity and size. Often, this is not the case in reality, where the largest firms (in terms
of employment) are not necessarily the most productive ones. The empirical implica-
tion is that, even after controlling for productivity, larger (in terms of employment)
firms may lay off more workers. To allow for this possibility, in column 2 of Table 1,
we estimate equation (3.2) after controlling for firm size, as proxied by the logarithm
of total number of employees. We label this variable SIZE. The new results are very
similar to the ones obtained without controlling for size. The estimates of α˜1 and
α˜2 are significant and have the expected signs and relative magnitude. This suggests
that not controlling for employment (size) does not have severe consequences for the
empirical performance of the model. In addition, we provide empirical support for the
hypothesis that larger firms lay off more workers. More specifically, we estimate that,
all else equal, one percent increase in total, firm-level employment is associated with
0.13% increase in trade-induced layoffs, which is both statistically and economically
significant. Finally, it is worth noting that the changes in the productivity cutoffs,
reported in the bottom panel of the table, are now slightly larger in magnitude and
more precisely estimated. Overall, these results suggest that productivity and size
20Below, we draw inferences based on the standard, for the trade literature, value the elasticity
of substitution σ = 6. To ease interpretation of of our results however, one can think of (3.1) as
a semi-structural specification, where the elasticity of substitution σ is set to 2. In this case, the
structural model becomes lct − ltl = (σ−1)fxϕctx (1 + t
ct)ϕ− (σ−1)fx
ϕtlx
(1 + ttl)ϕ.
21Standard errors are calculated with the Delta method.
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Table 1: Trade Liberalization, Productivity and Layoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BASE EMPL IV POLIT SLCT LIBER EXPRT
L3.T*TFP 17.217 17.209 154.077 149.647 104.224
(6.008)** (5.961)** (62.944)* (62.676)* (22.393)**
T*TFP -25.509 -27.412 -226.285 -221.293 -141.373
(6.710)** (6.693)** (87.892)* (88.185)* (33.438)**
TFP -1.998 64.756
(6.906) (28.575)*
LIBER 49.743 49.658
(13.324)** (13.202)**
SIZE 0.130 0.149 0.139 0.164 0.151 0.156
(0.042)** (0.056)** (0.054)* (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.033)**
POLIT 0.185
(0.158)
EXP 69.604
(29.055)*
TFP*EXP -69.923
(29.160)*
Constant 4.310 3.164 3.491 5.017 -57.994
(0.167)** (0.376)** (1.071)** (6.991) (28.490)*
SUFFER
POLIT -0.250 -0.250 -0.250
(0.070)** (0.070)** (0.070)**
TARIFF -31.001 -31.001 -31.001
(2.682)** (2.682)** (2.682)**
∆IMP 0.401 0.401 0.401
(0.098)** (0.098)** (0.098)**
LABOR COST -0.037 -0.037 -0.037
(0.022)+ (0.022)+ (0.022)+
Constant 1.553 1.553 1.553
(0.832)+ (0.832)+ (0.832)+
Mills Ratio -1.061 -1.352 -1.324
λ (0.291)** (0.278)** (0.278)**
N 1259 1259 1158 1158 2063 2063 2063
Chi2
R2, Wald− χ2 0.198 0.211 306.57 272.53 282.64
UnderId 11.167 10.506
OverId 0.965 0.968
%∆ϕctx -7.56 -8.89 -7.39 -7.52 -5.91
(4.49)+ (4.44)* (1.33)** (1.38)** (1.02)**
%∆ϕct 7.28 8.61 7.11 7.47 5.56
(4.50) (4.46)+ (1.37)** (1.39)** (1.03)**
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. The dependent variable is always the
logarithm of firm layoffs. Estimates of the 3-digit SIC FEs, used in each estimation, are omitted for brevity.
Errors in each estimation are clustered by firm and 3-digit SIC industry.
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may be not be perfectly correlated as suggested by theory, and that in practice each
of these variables may have separate effects on layoffs.
We have good reasons to believe that the OLS estimates presented so far may
be biased. The reason is that the covariates from 3.1 are potentially endogenous.
For example, as function of labor, TFP is endogenous by construction. Therefore,
we need to account for this endogeneity due to simultaneity.22 In addition, Yotov
(2010a) shows that trade-induced unemployment is an important determinant of US
trade policy.23 This implies that our trade variables, especially current tariffs, are
endogenous as well. To address the issue of endogeneity, we estimate equation (3.2)
using the instrumental variable and general method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator.
Our instruments include: lagged productivity, 5-year lagged tariffs, tariffs from the
beginning of the period of investigation (1979), the squares of the instruments and
their interactions. IV-GMM estimates are reported in column 3 of Table 1.
Before we interpret the results, we make sure that our instruments have the nec-
essary properties to validate the IV estimator. We test for under-identification, which
checks whether the instruments are relevant and correlated with the endogenous regres-
sors, and for overidentification, which tests whether our instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. χ2 statistics from these tests are reported toward the bottom
of Table 1. Based on these values, we reject the null (UnderId) hypothesis, which
implies that the model is not under-identified, and we fail to reject the null (OverId)
hypothesis, meaning that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the
estimated equation.
Two properties of the IV-GMM estimates stand out. First, they imply that not
accounting for endogeneity causes severe biases. Both α˜1 and α˜2 are significantly larger
in absolute value as compared to their OLS counterparts. Second, the IV estimates of
the changes in the productivity cutoffs are smaller, however, more precisely estimated
than the OLS numbers from columns 1 and 2. We estimate both a significant decrease
in the export productivity cutoff of 7.39% (standard error 1.33) and a significant
increase of 7.11% (standard error 1.37) in the domestic productivity cutoff.
The fact that we are investigating the effect of trade liberalization on labor layoffs
22TFP might also be related to trade liberalization. For example, Bustos (2006) finds that increased
export opportunities can have a positive influence on firm performance. She shows that a fall in
trading partners’ tariffs increases revenues for exporters, who in turn adopt new technologies profitable
for more firms. Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) conduct an empirical study about the effects of
anti-dumping protection on the productivity of domestic, import-competing firms and find that firms
that receive protection improve their productivity. Pavcnik (2002) uses data on Chilean plants and
finds evidence that productivity increases after trade liberalization for plants in the import competing
sector.
23Furthermore, Yotov (2010b) estimates that, when choosing the level of sectoral trade protection,
the US government attaches four times more weight to the welfare of trade-affected workers.
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only for the firms that are labeled as suffering from trade, implies that our results
may be subject to a selection bias, which means that firms in the estimation sample
might have been selected in a non-random manner. To address this problem, we follow
Heckman (1979) and set up the following econometric model:
LAY OFFi = α0 + α1L3.Tj ∗ TFPi + α2Tj ∗ TFPi + ε1ij, (3.4)
where a layoff is observed if:
γ0 + γ1EXCLi + γXij + ε2ij > 0. (3.5)
Here, ε1ij and ε2ij are correlated and jointly normally distributed. Equation (3.5) is
our selection equation, based on whether a firm suffers from trade or not. EXCLi
is the exclusionary variable, which we describe below, and Xij is a set of control
variables, which, we believe, may affect the outcome of the TAA certification process.
The control covariates that we use to estimate (3.5) include: the level of sectoral trade
protection proxied by industry tariffs, TARIFF; the change in imports, ∆ IMP, which
is the key variable used by the government in the determination of TAA-certification
outcomes and firm-level labor costs, LABOR COST.
Finding a good exclusionary variable is crucial for sound econometric results in
a selection model. Fortunately, a closer look into the Petition for Trade Adjustment
Assistance data, which we use to measure firm-level trade-induced unemployment,
gives us an excellent opportunity to construct a good exclusionary variable. In order
to get TAA, laid-off employees have to go through a formal process of certification,
where the government determines whether a firm is really affected by trade or suffers
for any other reason, and verifies whether a group of workers are laid off due to trade
related problems. Given the unified federal TAA certification procedures, one would
expect that if two firms produce identical products and one of them is TAA-certified,
the other should also be eligible to enter the program. Surprisingly, this is not the
case. There are instances in the data when, even branches of the same company,
producing identical products but operating in different states, have different outcomes
when applying for TAA. This suggests that there might be some state characteristic
that affects government’s decision to grant TAA, which in turn we could use to identify
our selection model.
Influenced by the large success of the political economy literature of trade and
protectionism, we thought that overall political affiliation of a firm’s state might be a
good indicator of the firm’s chances for TAA-certification. At the same time, whether
a state is blue or red should not be related to any firm’s performance, and trade-
induced layoffs, in particular. Thus, we identify the political orientation of the state
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for each firm in our sample (based on the results in the election year preceding the
petition year from our data) and use it as an exclusionary variable in the selection
model (3.4)-(3.5). We assign a value of one to the exclusionary variable, POLIT, if a
state is classified as republican.
To check whether our exclusionary variable has any explanatory power in the struc-
tural equation (3.4), we first re-estimate the specification from column (3) with POLIT
as an additional covariate. As can be seen from column 4 of Table 1, we find no signif-
icant correlation between the political affiliation of a state and the number of workers
laid off due to trade by a firm operating in this state. This is supported by the in-
significant coefficient on POLIT. In addition, the signs, magnitude and significance of
the other explanatory variables do not change.24 Overall, these results suggest that
POLIT might be a good exclusionary variable for our selection model, as long as it is
a significant predictor of the probability for TAA certification. We check this next.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) results from the Heckman selection spec-
ification (3.4)-(3.5) are reported in column 5 of Table 1. We start with analysis of the
selection equation. First, and most importantly, we see that the coefficient on POLIT
in the first stage equation is significant. This, in combination with a significant es-
timate of the Mills λ = -.868 (standard error 0.284), reported toward the bottom of
column 5, shows that the selection equation and the main equation are not indepen-
dent. The negative sign of the coefficient on POLIT implies that, all else equal, it
is less likely to become TAA-certified in a republican state.25 More importantly, the
estimate on POLIT is significant, which reinforces our hypothesis that it is a good ex-
clusionary variable indeed. The negative sign of the coefficient estimate of TARIFF is
expected: Higher level of tariffs are associated with lower probability to enter the TAA
program. The intuition is that higher tariffs result in less imports and less lost market
shares for the domestic firms, which, in turn, lay off fewer workers. Increase in im-
ports increases the probability for TAA certification. This is captured by the positive
and significant estimate of the coefficient on ∆IMP , and should not be surprising be-
cause, as mentioned earlier, import changes are key determinants of TAA- certification
outcomes. The negative and significant coefficient on LCOST indicates that higher
labor costs are associated with lower probability to suffer from trade-induced layoffs
and, therefore, qualify for TAA. A possible explanation is that better paid workers
might have more human capital and represent firms in industries in which the US has
comparative advantage.
24It is possible that political affiliation of a state is associated with trade protection for the main
state industry. This explains the small changes in the magnitude of the estimates.
25This, by itself, is a very interesting finding, which we investigate more thoroughly in a separate
paper. For the current purposes, our only goal is to find a reasonable (theoretically sound and
satisfying the econometric tests) exclusionary variable. POLIT meets our needs.
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Next, we turn to the main (second-stage) estimation results, which are obtained
after controlling for selection (and for endogeneity as well). Qualitatively, the new
findings are very similar to the IV-GMM results presented in column 3, which only
control for endogeneity, and to the OLS estimates from the first two columns of the
table. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between TFP and lagged tariffs is
positive and significant, while the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction between
TFP and current tariffs is negative and significant. In addition, the estimate of α1
is smaller, in absolute value, as compared to the estimate of α2. Quantitatively the
‘selection’ estimates are significantly smaller than their IV counterparts. This suggests
that the bias when selection is not controlled for is upward and significant. Finally, in
terms of cutoff changes, we find that the selection specification, which also controls for
endogeneity, produces the smallest, but most precisely estimated, changes of -5.91%
(standard error 1.02) and 5.56% (standard error 1.03) in the export and the domestic
cutoff, respectively.
In our next experiment, we use alternative (1-year and 5-year) tariff lags. Results
are omitted for brevity, but are available upon request. In each case, the estimates of
α˜1 and α˜2 have the expected signs and are significant. Worthy of note, however, is the
comparison between the changes in the productivity cutoffs obtained with different
lags. We estimate a fall of 1.58% (standard error 1.75) in the export productivity cut-
off with the 1-year tariff lags.26 On the other hand, we find a significant corresponding
fall of 11.49% (standard error 0.86) with the 5-year lagged tariffs. These results are
in accordance with theory, as, on average, longer time horizons are associated with
more liberalization and, therefore, more more pronounced consequences. Importantly,
our findings indicate that current layoffs may be associated with lagged trade liberal-
ization and increased import competition over a wide time horizon. This result has
implications for the design of the trade adjustment assistance certification procedure.
So far, our empirical findings are in perfect accordance with the theoretical pre-
dictions of the structural model. In particular, across all specifications, the estimates
are always significant and with signs as expected. In addition, the relative magnitude
of the estimates supports the structural prediction of falling zero-profit export pro-
ductivity cutoff, which we also translated into an increasing (but by less) zero-profit
domestic productivity cutoff. While encouraging, in terms of their statistical signifi-
cance and relative magnitude, the findings from the first five columns of Table 1 do
not allow us to directly decompose the effects of productivity and trade liberalization
on layoffs. In particular, according to Proposition 2.2, we expect to find a positive cor-
relation between both trade liberalization and layoffs as well as between productivity
26We were not surprised to find that the change in the export productivity cutoff was not significant
with 1-year lagged tariffs. This finding confirms the general belief that trade (and other) variables
need more time to respond to trade shocks and policies.
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and layoffs.
We test the relationship between productivity and layoffs in two different ways.
First, we use the estimates from column 5 (our most preferred specification), along
with the mean of lagged and current tariffs, to estimate the effect of productivity on
layoffs as:
∂LAY OFFi
∂TFPi
= α̂1L3.T + α̂2T , (3.6)
where L3.T and T are the weighted average levels of the 3-year lagged L3.Tj’s and
the current Tj’s, respectively, across all sectors. To construct the tariff means, we
use import values as weights. The result is surprising. We estimate the effect of
productivity on layoffs to be negative and significant, ∂LAY OFFi
∂TFPi
= −.91 (standard
error .289). However, theory predicts a positive relationship between productivity
and layoffs for the firms in our sample. To confirm this puzzling finding, we use an
alternative specification of our structural equation (3.1), which we express as:
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)fx
[(
1 + tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
−
(
1 + ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1. (3.7)
(3.7) translates into the following econometric specification:
LAY OFFi = β0 + β1LIBERj + β2TFPi + β3SIZEi + ϑj + ij, (3.8)
where, LAY OFFi and TFPi are defined as before. SIZEi is the logarithm of total,
firm-level employment. ϑj is the set of 3-digit SIC fixed effects. Finally, LIBERj
proxies for trade liberalization, and is constructed as the difference between the log-
arithms of 3-year lagged and current ad-valorem tariffs in industry j. In accordance
with our theory, we expect the estimate of β1 to be positive, indicating that trade
liberalization causes layoffs, and the estimate of β2 to be positive as well, capturing
the direct relationship between productivity and layoffs.
Estimates of (3.8), obtained after simultaneously controlling for selection and en-
dogeneity, are reported in column 6 of Table 1.27 Several properties stand out. First,
as before, we find that larger firms, in terms of employment, lay off more workers.
The estimate on SIZE is positive, significant and very similar in magnitude to the
previous results. Second, as predicted by theory, more trade liberalization is associ-
ated with more layoffs. This is captured by the positive and significant estimate of the
coefficient on LIBER. Given our definition of this variable, the estimate on LIBER
implies that one percent increase in the ratio between 3-year lagged and current tariffs
27Results obtained with alternative estimators (e.g., IV or OLS) are similar and are available upon
request.
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is associated with about 50 percent increase in firm-level layoffs. Finally, even though
theory predicts that β̂2 should be positive, we estimate the coefficient on TFP to be
negative, as suggested by our previous findings, but not significant.
Why do not data conform with theory? Next, we provide (and test) a possible,
intuitive explanation. Our hypothesis is that the direction of the relationship between
productivity and trade-induced layoffs is contingent upon firms’ export status. In par-
ticular, we suspect that, in reality, more productive exporters lay off less workers. The
reason is that rather than, as suggested by theory, laying off workers who produce for
the domestic market and then hiring workers to produce exports, it is very plausi-
ble that, in practice, exporters are just shifting part of their production, along with
the accompanying labor force, from serving the domestic to serving the foreign mar-
ket. Proposition 2.2 states that more productive exporters will have more net hires,
which, in line with the current discussion, implies that more productive exporters will
probably suffer less trade-induced layoffs.
To test our hypothesis, we extend specification (3.8). In particular, we introduce a
dummy variable, EXPi, which takes a value of one for exporters, and an interaction
term between the export status dummy and firm productivity, EXPi∗TFPi, which will
allow us to decompose productivity effects by firm type.28 Thus, the new econometric
specification becomes:
LAY OFFi = γ0+γ1LIBERj+γ2TFPi+γ3SIZE+γ4EXPi+γ4EXPi∗TFPi+ϑj+ζij,
(3.9)
Results from the estimation of (3.9) are reported in the last column of Table 1.29 The
findings are in accordance with our expectations and hypothesis. In particular, we
see that the relationship between productivity and trade-induced layoffs is positive for
the firms that only sell domestically. This is captured by the positive and significant
estimate of the coefficient on TFPi, and is as predicted by the theoretical model.
In addition, we estimate a negative and significant relationship between productivity
and layoffs for the exports. This supports our intuitive, empirical hypothesis that,
rather than laying off workers for domestic production and hiring new workers for
exports, exporters just shift labor internally. Finally, we see that the estimates of
SIZE and LIBER are not affected by the introduction of the new control variables.
This suggests that, regardless of their export status, larger firms lay off more workers
28As noted in the data section, we follow Denis et al. (2002) who use the series “Geographic Segment
Type” from Compustat in order to classify a firm as an exporter. In accordance with theory, our
data reveals than many (in fact the majority) of the firms who layoff workers due to trade are indeed
exporters.
29To estimate (3.9), we simultaneously control for endogeneity and selection.Breaking the sample by
firm type and estimating two separate systems produces very similar results. We prefer the estimates
obtained with the aggregate sample because those are more efficient.
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due to trade, and also that trade liberalization affects both exporters and domestic
producers equally on the domestic market. This is encouraging evidence in support of
the general predictions of the firm-heterogeneity theory.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to fill a gap between the vast amount of theoretical lit-
erature devoted to studying the interactions between firm productivity, trade, and
trade liberalization, and the lack of empirical evidence for these relationships when
labor markets are in question. The main contribution of our work is threefold: First,
concentrating on the labor market implications of the Melitz (2003) model, and using
data that enables us to measure directly firm-level layoffs caused by trade, we quantify
the relationships between productivity, trade liberalization and trade-induced layoffs.
Second, we provide empirical evidence for key theoretical predictions from previous
studies regarding the direction and magnitude of the changes in the minimum pro-
ductivity thresholds required for domestic production as well as exports. Finally, by
incorporating intuitive labor market interactions that are not explicitly captured in
Melitz’s model, we reconcile some discrepancies between theory and empirics and we
open avenues for further theoretical work.
Overall, our empirical findings are in accordance with the theoretical predictions
of the model. In particular, we find that increase in trade liberalization is associated
with more layoffs at the firm level. In addition, we estimate decrease in the export
productivity cutoff and an increase (but smaller in absolute value) in the zero-profit
productivity cutoff for domestic production, when a country liberalizes its trade pol-
icy. An interesting, and puzzling, empirical result is that, contrary to the theoretical
predictions, more productive firms lay off fewer workers, all else equal. We recon-
cile theory and empirics by allowing for different productivity effects across exporters
and non-exporters. The new estimations support the empirical hypothesis that more
productive exporters lay off less workers, while the relationship between productivity
and layoffs is positive and significant for the domestically producing firms, which is in
accordance with theory.
An interesting extension of our paper will be to test whether and how our findings
differ for industries with comparative advantage as opposed to industries with compar-
ative disadvantage. For example, Bernard et al. (2007), extend Melitz’s (2003) model
to allow for firm heterogeneity in a comparative advantage setting. They show that the
zero-profit productivity cutoff increases in both types of industries but the increase is
bigger in the sectors with comparative advantage. In addition, the export productivity
cutoff is closer to the zero productivity cutoff in sectors with comparative advantage.
In regard to the labor market, their findings suggest that trade liberalization results
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in simultaneous job creation and job destruction in all industries, but comparative
disadvantage industries exhibit net job destruction while comparative advantage in-
dustries experience net job creation. Our data allows for various tests of their model,
depending on industry type.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Apply the relationship in equation (2.9) to trade liberalization
to show that
∣∣∣ϕct−ϕtlϕct ∣∣∣ = ϕctx −ϕtlx 1+tct1+ttlϕctx . (We use this expression in the empirical section of
the text to translate the changes in the export cutoffs into changes in the domestic cutoffs.)
Trade liberalization, measured by reduction in tariffs, implies 1+t
ct
1+ttl
> 1, which means that
ϕtlx
1+tct
1+ttl
> ϕtlx and, therefore,
ϕctx −ϕtlx 1+t
ct
1+ttl
ϕctx
=
∣∣∣ϕct−ϕtlϕct ∣∣∣ < ϕctx −ϕtlxϕctx .
Proof of Proposition 2.2 Parts (a) and (b): Using Equation 2.2 for lct and its counter
part for ltl we can express the change in labor as:
lct − ltl = (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1 (4.1)
We know from theory that the zero profit productivity cutoff for domestic production in-
creases after a country moves from costly trade to liberalized trade:
ϕtl > ϕct(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1
<
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
0 <
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1
0 < (σ − 1)f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1 = lct − ltl (4.2)
The positive sign indicates that the number of workers employed under costly trade was
higher than the number of workers employed under trade liberalization, i.e. there have
been labor layoffs for domestic production. Additionally more liberalization will imply a
larger discrepancy between the zero profit productivity cutoffs, and hence a higher number
of layoffs. Also, taking the derivative of equation 4.1 with respect to ϕ:
∂(lct − ltl)
∂ϕ
= (σ − 1)2f
[(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1]
ϕσ−2 > 0, (4.3)
we find that if a firm is more productive it lays off more workers.
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Part (c): For the change in labor for export production:
nlctx − nltlx = nrctx (ϕ)
σ − 1
σ
− nrtlx (ϕ)
σ − 1
σ
= n(1 + tct)1−σrctd (ϕ)
σ − 1
σ
− n(1 + ttl)1−σrtld (ϕ)
σ − 1
σ
(4.4)
= n(1 + tct)1−σ(σ − 1)fx
(
1 + tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1
−n(1 + ttl)1−σ(σ − 1)fx
(
1 + ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1
nlctx − nltlx = n(σ − 1)fx
[(
1
ϕctx
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtlx
)σ−1]
ϕσ−1 (4.5)
By using the relationship ϕtlx > ϕ
tl
x , we can conclude that nl
ct
x − nltlx < 0, i.e. there are gross
hires for export production. Similar to the previous part we see that more liberalization
will imply a larger change in the zero profit export cutoff and more labor hires. Taking the
derivative of equation 4.5 with respect to ϕ:
∂(lct − ltl)
∂ϕ
= n(σ − 1)2fx
[(
1
ϕctx
)σ−1
−
(
1
ϕtlx
)σ−1]
ϕσ−2 < 0, (4.6)
we find that the more productive export firms will be hiring more workers.
Part (d): To see the overall effect of trade liberalization on labor layoffs for exporters:
lct − ltl = σ − 1
σ
[
1 + n(1 + tct)1−σ
]
rctd (ϕ)−
σ − 1
σ
[
1 + n(1 + ttl)1−σ
]
rtld (ϕ)
= (σ − 1) [1 + n(1 + tct)1−σ] f ( 1
ϕct
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 −
(σ − 1)
[
1 + n(1 + ttl)1−σ
]
f
(
1
ϕtl
)σ−1
ϕσ−1
= (σ − 1)f
[
1 + n(1 + tct)1−σ
(ϕct)σ−1
− 1 + n(1 + t
tl)1−σ
(ϕtl)σ−1
]
. (4.7)
As shown in the appendix of Melitz (2003) since
∂
[
1+n(1+t)1−σ
ϕσ−1
]
∂t < 0, the expression in square
brackets is negative. Notice that tct > ttl, 1+n(1+t
ct)1−σ
(ϕct)σ−1 <
1+n(1+ttl)1−σ
(ϕtl)σ−1 , and l
ct − ltl < 0 and
exporters hire workers. Once again, we see that the larger the change in tariffs, the larger
its effect will be on the net labor hires for exporters. Moreover, taking the derivative of
equation 4.7:
∂lct − ltl
ϕ
= (σ − 1)2f
[
1 + n(1 + tct)1−σ
(ϕct)σ−1
− 1 + n(1 + t
tl)1−σ
(ϕtl)σ−1
]
ϕσ−2 > 0,
(4.8)
we find that if a firm is more productive it hires more workers.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Suffer=1 Suffer=0
Mean Std. Dev. P(25) P(75) Mean Std. Dev. P(25) P(75)
LAID OFF WORKERS 176.908 421.875 27 184 233.519 634.406 25 200
TFP 0.999 0.007 0.996 1.002 1.000 0.008 0.997 1.003
TARIFF 0.026 0.032 0.005 0.036 0.033 0.041 0.007 0.0457
LIBER 0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.009 -0.000 0.003
SIZE 22989.91 30870.77 3411 29000 32695.65 40770.91 4800 43000
LABOR COST 824.724 1263.445 91.636 960.085 1010.319 1441.828 138.405 1250.752
IMPORTS 3.179 2.443 1.371 4.457 2.219 2.161 0.662 3.304
POLIT 0.547 0.498 0 1 0.719 0.450 0 1
EXPORT 0.912 0.284 1 1 0.946 0.226 1 1
N 1158 905
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